Constitutional Challenges to Gerrymanders
Reapportionment litigation falls into two broad classes. Within
the first class are those challenges to districting schemes that allege
violations of the one person, one vote mandate of Reynolds v. Sims.'
These cases 2 involve a relatively straightforward inquiry into the
population disparities among a state's election districts: -the issue
is whether district-to-district variations lie within permissible limits. Such cases are appropriately designated as "quantitative" reapportionment cases. 3 More complex, and not yet judicially settled, is
the second class of cases: challenges to gerrymanders based upon a
broad interpretation of Reynolds's command that all voters must
have an "equally effective voice"' in the election of their representatives. These "qualitative" claims are founded on the recognition
that equality of voting district populations does not guarantee
"substantive equality in the sharing of power."'
The gerrymander may be defined as a division of electoral districts that maximizes the voting strength of one political party or
faction.6 Three types of gerrymander may give rise to qualitative
districting challenges: (1) splitting a hostile voting group among
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2 See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 740-51 (1953); Mahan v. Howell, 410

U.S. 315 (1973); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
3 Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has stated that
the basis for challenges to such numerical disparity among voting districts lies in the
"dilution" of the strength of the individual's vote. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346
(1960) (discussing Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)).
377 U.S. at 565.
Casper, Social Differences and the Franchise,105 DAEDALus 103, 112 (1976); see Neal,
Baker v. Cars. Politics in Search of Law, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 252, 278.
' Judge, now Justice, Stevens adopted the following definition of "gerrymander": "an
unfair arrangement of electoral districts designed by the dominant party to give it an advantage over its rival in future elections." Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 847 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (Stevens, Cir. J., dissenting). See L. TRmF, AmxmcAN
CoNsrrrioNAL LAw § 13-9, 756 n.1 (1978). This comment will adopt a somewhat broader
definition: gerrymandering is districting with discriminatory effects that result not only from
a legislative intent, but may result from any facially neutral districting plan. See R. DIxON,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTA TON: REAPPORTIONMENT N LAW AND PoLrIcs 461-63 (1968). The use
of districting itself has been demonstrated to create a bias in favor of the dominant political
party. Id. at 462. The possibility of "underrepresentation" of voting factions exists to a lesser extent under systems of proportional representation, such as those of the Netherlands
and Israel. See D. RAE, THE PoLmcAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION LAws 28-39, 87-103 (1967).
Within the scope of the term "gerrymander" lie both constitutionally "fair" and "unfair"
districting schemes. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (gerrymander designed
to apportion legislative seats fairly between political parties).
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several districts so that it constitutes a minority in each,7 (2) concentrating a voting bloc into one district of nearly unanimous opinion," and (3) creating multimember districts9 or providing for atlarge election of representatives. 10 Each of these forms of gerrymandering has the effect of "diluting" the political power of a minority
voting group. By eliminating the minority group's influence in the
political system or by minimizing the number of districts the minority group controls, these gerrymanders effectively debase the individual vote of each member of the group."
Until recently, gerrymanders were immune from challenge in
the courts even though they had been attacked for elevating the
interests and opinions of some voters over those of others.12 In 1962
3
in Baker v. Carr,1
the Supreme Court rejected the view that apportionment controversies are beyond judicial scrutiny. Lower courts
have, however, continued to hold certain types of gerrymander
claims nonjusticiable. 14 The challenges to gerrymandering that have
See, e.g., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
a See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Such districting "wastes" the votes
of the supramajority.
I See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
"9Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d
238 (5th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-1844). Multimember and at-large districting plans cancel out the "natural effect" of a cohesive residency
pattern of a voting bloc. Nevett, 571 F.2d at 216.
" See R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 462-63. In the wake of the Supreme Court's "one man,
one vote" pronouncement in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which foreclosed numerical malapportionment as a means of rigging the balance of political power, the gerrymander
has become state legislatures' primary vehicle for protecting the political power of the
controlling party. Moreover, commentators have noted that the mandate of equally weighted
votes has had the inadvertent effect of significantly increasing the use of gerrymanders to
manipulate the electoral process. See, e.g., Clinton, Further Exploration in the Political
Thicket: The Gerrymander and the Constitution, 59 IowA L. Rzv. 1, 4 (1973); Elliot,
Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound. The Political Consequences of
Reapportionment,37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 474, 483 (1970).
,1This immunity reflected the long-standing view that the drawing of election boundaries and the apportionment of representatives were political questions constitutionally committed to the state legislatures; allowing only for limited oversight by Congress in the case of
federal elections. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (plurality opinion). It was
thought unseemly and intrusive for judges to venture into the."political thicket", id. at 556,
and, in effect, to adjudicate particular eledion outcomes. In general, the evils of gerrymanders were preferred to the expansive judicial role required for their remedy. As Justice Rutledge noted in Colegrove: "[T]he cure sought may be worse than the disease." Id. at 566
(Rutledge, J., concurring). This disapproval of "judicious tinkering" with district lines has
by no means disappeared from the federal bench. See Judge Gee's concurrence in Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) (Gee, J.,
specially concurring).
' 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" See, e.g., Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 844-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 893 (1972); Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 54 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cannella, J., concur-

1978]

Constitutional Challenges to Genymanders

been adjudicated by the courts over the last twenty years have been
based on two distinct and not entirely compatible theories. In some
cases, courts have heard claims asserting that gerrymanders directed against racial groups constitute a type of racial discrimination or segregation. 15 In others, plaintiffs have argued that state
districting schemes that diminish the power of identifiable political
groups fall within the prohibition of unequal individual voting
power articulated in Baker and Reynolds."6 The two approaches
have not always been distinguished, largely because most gerrymander challenges have been brought by racial groups."
This comment will argue that successful challenges to various
sorts of districting plans may be founded upon a unified concept:
dilution of voting power. The theory of voting dilution relies on a
constitutional right of equality of voting power and presupposes that
the importance of the individual vote lies in the ability of identifiable political groups to exercise political power. The characterization
of the voting dilution cause of action as a voting rights claim-and
not a claim of racial discrimination-has two important implications. First, the cause of action should be available to both racial
and nonracial, politically cohesive groups. Second, the rationale
underlying the voting dilution cause of action militates against a
strict requirement of showing discriminatory intent in the drawing
of the challenged districting plan. Although the failure of the courts
to view districting challenges as voting power cases has generated

contrary holdings and dicta, both propositions are consistent with
a coherent view of the cause of action.
ring), affl'd, 398 U.S. 901 (1970); Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp 739, 833 (D. Del. 1967);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965).
11E.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 54 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
'1 E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). These challenges, generally called voting dilution
claims, have most frequently been attacks on the peculiar problems of multimember districts.
1' See, e.g., Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d
248 (5th Cir. 1978); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Lipscomb v. Wise, 551 F.2d
1043 (5th Cir. 1977), reu'd,98 S. Ct. 2493 (1978); Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1976);
Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
Is Most courts have applied the term "voting dilution" to describe only multimember
districting cases. Judge Tjoflat's opinion in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978),
for example, distinguished within the broad class of "qualitative" reapportionment cases
those alleging gerrymander (fencing out or slicing up an interest group) from those attacking
multimember or at-large districting plans, identifying only the latter as resting on a "dilution" theory. Id. at 216. This comment treats voting dilution claims as coterminous with
"qualitative" districting challenges. Voting dilution is the theory upon which some, but not
all, gerrymanders may be found unconstitutional.
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I. DISTRCTING PLANS SUBJECT TO VOTING DILUTION CLAIMS
Current judicial analysis of voting dilution claims is a response
to the particular problem of multimember districting. Where there
are cohesive majority and minority factions, if cumulative voting is
not permitted, multimember districting can minimize the electoral
power of a political minority by facilitating the election of an entire
slate of candidates representing the majority.19 In the wake of the
Reynolds requirement that election districts be of equal population," groups of voters attacked multimember districts as creating
discriminatory disparities between majority and minority representation.21 The Supreme Court, however, notwithstanding the effects
of multimember districting plans, has not considered the consequences of such districting-without more-to be sufficient to inval22
idate all multimember schemes.
In Fortson v. Dorsey,2 the first multimember districting case
to reach the Supreme Court, plaintiffs alleged that populous districts with more than one representative denied the residents of
those districts "a vote 'approximately equal in weight to that of'
voters resident in single-member constituencies. ' 2 The Court rejected the contention that plaintiffs were victims of discrimination,
finding that legislators elected at-large from multimember districts
adequately represented all the citizens of their districts. Although
the Court declined to find multimember districts unconstitutional
per se,2 it recognized that there might be constitutional impedi", Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 386 U.S.
120, 126 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 391 (D.N.D.

1974) (Bright, J., dissenting), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Washington, Does the Constitution
Guarantee Fair and Effective Representation to All Interest Groups Making Up the

Electorate?, 17 How. L.J. 91 (1971); Note, Ghetto Voting and At-Large Elections: A Subtle
Infringement Upon Minority Rights, 58 Gao. L.J. 989 (1970); Note, Multi-Member Legislative Districts:Requiem for a ConstitutionalBurial, 29 U. FIA. L. Rav. 703 (1977).

2 377 U.S. at 577.
21Equal population is required to ensure "substantially equal.
citizens." Id. at 568.

. . representation

for all

12Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 156 (1971). But cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S.
407, 415 (1977) (single-member districts preferred because "multimember districting . . .

tend[s] to submerge electoral minorities and over-represent electoral majorities"). The
Court has found the effect of multimember districting serious enough to require prior ap-

proval of such plans by the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 554 (1969) (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-4 (1970)); cf. Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1975) (prior approval required under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1970)). In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that the adoption of a multimember
plan may nullify voters' ability to elect candidates of their choice in much the same way as

their outright disenfranchisement. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. at 569.
" 379 U.S. 433 (1965).

u Id. at 437.
21 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966);
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ments to multimember schemes that "minimize or cancel out"2' the
voting strength of a cohesive group. The Court, in Whitcomb v.
Chavis,2 again upheld a plan that used multimember districts, but
for the first time suggested the contours of a constitutional attack
on such plans. It was not enough, said the Court, for the group to
claim voting dilution because of suffering "the disaster of losing too
many elections;"s plaintiffs2 ' had not shown that multimember districts were "conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further
racial or economic discrimination.""0 Nor had plaintiffs shown that
they were denied the opportunity to register to vote, to participate
in slate-making, or to run for office on a major party ticket.3 1 The
Court concluded that a plan would be struck down only if members
of a minority were denied the opportunity "to participate in the
32
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
In White v. Regester,s a plan similar to the one upheld in
Chavis was overturned. Although the Court analyzed the two cases
under a single equal protection theory, 3' it held in Regester that the
multimember districts used in Dallas and Bexar Counties violated
the equal protection guarantees by discriminating against racial
minorities in those counties. The Court accepted the plaintiffs'
claims that their voting rights had been diluted because: there was
a history of underrepresentation of black and Mexican-American
interests;36 these minorities continued to suffer the effects of past
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
2 Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (dictum); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965) (dictum).
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id. at 153.
2

The plaintiffs were blacks and poor persons living in inner city Indianapolis, who were

alleged to have "particular demographic characteristics rendering them cognizable as a minority interest group with distinctive interests in specific areas of the substantive law." Id.
at 129.
" Id. at 149.
I' at 149.53.
Id.
2 Id. at 149. Multimember districts have also been observed to be discriminatory against
minorities because they force candidates to conduct a wider and more expensive campaign.
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 720-21 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
" 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
3 See id. at 765-66.
u The claim in one district was brought by Mexican-Americans, "an identifiable class
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes," 412 U.S. at 767. This claim could not have been
brought under the fifteenth amendment, which is only addressed to racial discrimination.
U Id.
at 766. See Comment, Reapportionment and Minority Politics, 6 CoLum. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REv. 107, 123-24 (1974) (suggesting that this difference between Regester and

Chavis is a crucial one). See also Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections: The
Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. Rnv. 353, 369-71 (1976).
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discrimination; and there was a demonstrated insensitivity to the
needs of minority citizens. Lower courts have subsequently relied on
the criteria set forth in Regester to overturn discriminatory multimember districting plans. 7
The Supreme Court has not squarely held that single-member
districting plans are subject to the same constitutional challenge as
plans unfairly drawing multimember district boundaries. Two recent opinions suggest, however, that the constitutional theory underlying Regester extends to discriminatory single-member districting. In Connor v. Finch,38 although the Court struck down a courtordered single-member districting scheme on malapportionment
grounds, it went out of its way to address a voting dilution challenge.39 There would be little reason for the Court to discuss the
"scattering" of minority voting concentrations 0 and the minimization of minority voting strength" unless these could form the basis
for a judicially cognizable claim. In United Jewish Organizationsv.
Carey, 2 the Court addressed the merits of a claim of a group of
Hasidic Jewish voters that single-member district lines in New York
City had been unconstitutionally drawn to create "safe" black districts, thus dividing the Hasidic community and splitting its vote. 3
The Court concluded that the case was not one of "racial or political
groups hav[ing] been fenced out of the political process and their
voting strength invidiously minimized."" Significantly, however,
the Court did not say that such a claim would be inappropriate in
this context.
Lower courts have consistently recognized that the voting dilution principle developed by the Court in the multimember district
cases is equally applicable to challenges to all forms of gerrymanders."5 Indeed, it is difficult to see how this conclusion could be
See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3221, (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-1844); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th

Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976).
431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
Id. at 421-26 (dictum). The Court noted that while it need not reach the issue, it would
give guidance to the district court in order to avoid further challenges to Mississippi's legislative apportionment before the 1979 elections. Id. at 421-22.
4 Id. at 422.
,"Id. at 425.
42 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
' Id.at 162-68.
" Id. at 167 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)). Before the Court,
petitioners alleged diminution of their power as white voters, 430 U.S. at 154, not as Hasidic
Jewish voters. The Court found white voters, as a group, to be fairly represented under the
existing districting scheme.
" Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505
F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.
1974).
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controverted.4 6 The opportunity "to participate in the political processes and elect legislators of [one's] choice"47 may be destroyed as
effectively by an artful crafting of district boundaries as by a multimember plan. The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has noted the broad
applicability 'of the voting dilution rationale, stating most recently
in Nevett v. Sides" that the "constitutional requisites" for the multimember district claim should be no different from those for gerrymanders of single member districts that concentrate, fence out, or
slice up a compact minority group. "In each instance, we are required to determine the same question, whether or not there has
been an unconstitutional manipulation of electoral district boundaries so as to minimize or dilute the voting strength of a minority
' 49
class or interest.

II.

GROUP VOTING POWER AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S
PARTICIPATE

RIGHT TO

Chavis and Regester, taken together, provide at best a rough
working test for identifying those cases in which a group's diminished political influence rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation of its members' right to vote. Although lower courts continue
to apply this test to multimember districting and have extended it
to all forms of gerrymanders, the precise requirements of the cause
of action remain unclear. The first step in defining the current limits
of the voting dilution cause of action is to examine in more detail
the basis for the Court's decision in Regester.
A.

The Rationale of the Voting Dilution Cause of Action

Most voting dilution cases have involved racial or ethnic groups
allegedly excluded from the political process. The need to protect
the individual's right to vote has as a result become blurred with
the constitutionally distinct doctrine of the need to protect racial
minorities from discrimination. Justice White's statement of the
" Manipulation of single member district boundaries embraces the same concerns unless
it is thought that inquiry into the gerrymandering of single-member, but not multimember,
district boundaries is precluded by the political question doctrine. See text and notes at notes
86-87 infra. One commentator has called a distinction between inquiry into multimember and
single-member districting "intellectually unappealing." R.DIXON, supra note 6, at 484.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
571 F.2d 209, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1978); accord, Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830,
849 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (Stevens, Cir. J., dissenting).
" 571 F.2d at 219 (quoting Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.
1974) (quoting Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972))).
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voting dilution case in Regester did not make explicit whether the
basis of the claim was racial discrimination, infringement of voting
rights, or both." In light of the precursors of Regester,51 however, it
seems more sensible to consider the voting rights strand of the
Court's reasoning to be fundamental.
1. Reynolds and Group Voting Rights. In Reynolds, which
held malapportioned districts unconstitutional, the fourteenth
amendment voting right was conceived as "individual and personal
in nature." 5 The effect of districting schemes that give the same
number of representatives to unequal numbers of voters was described as "identical" in effect to granting some voters more ballots
than others.53 But Reynolds can be read as providing the basis for a
broader doctrine.
[E]very citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative
bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as
qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent
them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state
government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature."'
The Court's opinion suggests that the individual right to vote means
more than the right to cast a ballot of numerically equal weight: the
language of the opinion implies a requirement that all voters have
an equal opportunity to affect election outcomes.
The "equally effective voice" mandated by Reynolds, if understood to mean a right to cast an equally significant vote in an election, can never be fully guaranteed. The voter in a swing district is
far more likely to affect the results than a voter in a safe district."
Similarly more potent is a vote in a district with low voter turnout.
10On the one hand, the Court cited Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), cases which are clearly based on nonracial conceptions of
equality of voting power. On the other hand, the Court repeatedly referred to the "racial
group" and to official racial discrimination. 412 U.S. at 765-70.
St E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
52 377 U.S. at 561. See the discussion of standing to sue in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204-08 (1962). See generally Karst, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward:EqualCitizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 27-29 (1977).
377 U.S. at 562-63.
Id. at 565.
403 U.S. at 169. For example, a voter in a district that is 50 percent Democratic and
50 percent Republican wields a great deal more power than a voter in a district that is 80
percent Democratic and 20 percent Republican.
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In multimember districting challenges," the courts have rejected
the argument that because an individual in a multimember district
has a greater possibility of breaking tie elections than a voter in a
single-member district,57 such schemes are unconstitutional. If read
more broadly to include effective participation at some level of the
electoral process-whether that be the slating of candidates, formulation of party policy, or influence in primary elections-this equal
opportunity is still an unreachable ideal. The individual voter's
actual political power will again necessarily vary with the demographically and politically diverse contexts of the electoral process.
It can be argued that although one person, one vote attempts
to protect the individual'sright to vote, implementation of the policy underlying the doctrine depends upon the equalization of voting
power among groups of voters. 8 Reynolds protected the individual
vote by guaranteeing equal representation to geographicalgroups,"
on the underlying assumption that legislators "represent" equally
well all the voters in their districts. In reality, however, decisive
voting cleavages more often run along economic, ideological, or racial lines that do not correspond to the shape of election districts.
Some voters feel better "represented" by a legislator in another
district than by one elected by their own. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged this political reality in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey." According to the Court, the member of a political
minority in one district is not denied his share of voting influence if
his group controls a fair share of other districts." The Court thus
divorced individual voting rights from the individual's effect on
elections, making it possible to draw from Reynolds the further
inference that the rule of one person, one vote protects groups of
" E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144-47 (1971) (majority opinion); id. at
168-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting on other grounds); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
" See Banzhaf, One Man, ? VoteT--MathematicalAnalysis of Voting Power aid Effective
Representation, 36 Gzo. WASH. L. Rav. 808 (1968); Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts: Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle?, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
" See Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 250 (1966) ("In simple terms, the vote is meaningless. . . unless it, taken in the aggregate with the votes of other citizens, results in effectuating the will of those citizens . . . .") (Fortas, J., dissenting); Casper, supra note 5 at 105.
11377 U.S. at 565. Justice Frankfurter correctly perceived that the basis of plaintiffs'
complaint in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was simply that their representatives were
not sufficiently numerous or powerful, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), not that
plaintiffs were denied the right to vote in the sense of casting their individual ballots. See
Irwin, Representationand Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 MICH. L.
Rzv. 729, 747-53 (1969).
U 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
" Id. at 166 n.24. But see id at 171 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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voters from having their political power unfairly diminished.2

The decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Reynolds
have further developed this view of the congruence of the individual
right to vote and group political power. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 3 decided the term after Reynolds, and again in Chavis, the Court suggested that the equal protection clause might protect "racial or
political elements of the voting population" 4 from having their voting strength minimized or cancelled out.15 In Regester, plaintiffs'

voting dilution claim was upheld in terms leaving little doubt that
a group right, rather than the individual's right to cast a ballot, was
at stake: each of the elements of a successful voting dilution claim
involved evidence of the group's lack of impact at the polls."
2. Voting Dilution and Racial Discrimination.There was no
suggestion in either Fortsonor Chavis that the voting dilution cause
of action was based upon aracial discrimination theory. Similarly,
the voting dilution claim upheld in Regester, which was grounded
in the non-racial line of precedent beginning with the holding of
justiciability in Baker, is fully supportable as the vindication of a
right to political participation by groups with identifiable cohesive
political interests.
Unfortunately for the sake of doctrinal clarity, Regester did not
rely unambiguously on nonracial grounds. The claim, brought by
blacks and Mexican-Americans," was also supported on the theory
that the multimember districting plan "enhanced the opportunity
for racial discrimination."" There are two versions of the racial
discrimination theory of Regester: first, that discrimination existed
in the community and in the provision of social services to the
minority groups; second, that the discrimination lay in the district2 Extending Reynolds to protect a minority group's voting rights does not imply, however, that such groups have a right to a proportionate number of seats in the legislature. See

Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 142-43 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977); see note 110 infra. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at § 13-9 n.11. What is
required is that, circumstances permitting, each political bloc have a proportional share of
influence on the selection of candidates and on the actions of candidates once elected. These
are the components of "political power" as that term is used in this comment.
13 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
403 U.S. at 143 (1971).
" See also 379 U.S. at 439.
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 n.10 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) ("[T]he [Regester] factors themselves are more relevant to
whether a group has access to the political decision-making process rather than to whether a

particular individual is free to vote.").
'5 The district court dismissed the dilution claim of Republican plaintiffs. Graves v.
Barnes, 343 Supp. 704, 734-35 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
" 412 U.S. at 766.
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ing plan itself, but was directed against black voters as blacks, not
as members of a political faction.
The first version surfaced in the Court's discussion of the
"cultural and economic realities of the Mexican-American community."" Single-member districts "were thought required to remedy" the legacy of invidious discrimination against this group of
voters." Persuasive as these cultural and economic realities may be
as a policy reason for special vigilance over the rights of oppressed
ethnic minorities, it is difficult to see why the right to equality of
treatment in these various areas, already independently protected
in large measure by the fourteenth amendment and by statute,71
could give rise to a right to vote greater than that of other citizens.
The more appealing version of the racial ground for the
Regester decision is the second: the gerrymander may be a direct
attempt to curtail the voting rights of the racial minority, regardless
of the political views of individual voters, because of a desire to
exclude the group:72 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,73 the decision of Tuskegee, Alabama, to change the city boundaries in order to eliminate
virtually all of the city's black residents was characterized as a form
of racial segregation and was overturned as a disenfranchisement of
blacks, violative of the fifteenth amendment.7 4 The plaintiffs in
Wright v. Rockefeller75 employed a similar racial segregation theory
to challenge the gerrymander of many New York blacks and Puerto
Ricans into one congressional district. The claim was rejected because plaintiffs failed to prove that the districts were carved along
" Id. at 768-69.

7' Id. at 769; cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (extension of the right
to vote to Spanish speaking voters justified in part to combat discrimination in the provision
of social services).
71 In some circumstances discrimination in the provision of social services can be attacked and remedied directly. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, rehearing
denied, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1971). Discrimination in employment, housing, and education
can also be attacked through the equal protection clause or under various statutes. E.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, or 2000e (1974).
Discrimination by a political party in the selection of its members may, however, be
immune from direct attack. Ordering a party to admit more members of a minority group
could be held to interfere with party members' freedom of association. Cf. Brown v. O'Brien,
469 F.2d 563, 570-72, (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 816 (1972) (Democratic Party has the
right to determine the qualifications of its convention delegates).
,1 Cf. Whitcomb v. Chdvis, 403 U.S. 124, 150-53 (1971) (black voters harmed, if at all,
as Democrats rather than as blacks).
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
, Id. at 346. The case could also have been decided under the fourteenth amendment,
see id. at 349 (Whittaker, J. concurring), and has been cited as if it were. Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. at 149. See Clinton, supra note 11, at 6-10; R. DIXON, supranote 6, at 117. Compare
Gomillion with City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
75376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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racial lines7 6 or that the plaintiff groups were disadvantaged by the
scheme.7
The Gomillion approach is vulnerable to the criticism that gerrymandering injures the minority group only in its capacity as a
political faction. If members of the minority voted no differently
from the population as a whole, the gerrymander would have no
effect, either on the composition of the elected officiary or on the
political power of the minority. It is the political, not the racial,
character of the group that is significant. Since the right to political
participation can be derived from the voting rights theory of Baker
and Reynolds, the additional racial ground for the voting dilution
claim is superfluous.
B.

Voting Dilution Claims of Nonracial Groups

If the right of all citizens to an equally effective voice in the
political process is understood as necessarily involving the protection of voting groups, the voting dilution cause of action derived
from this right should be available to nonracial as well as racial
groups of voters. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal
court, however, has overturned a districting plan challenged entirely
on a nonracial basis. On the contrary, in 1965, the Supreme Court
affirmed, per curiam, an appellate court judgment holding partisan
gerrymanders nonjusticiable15 This position has generally been
79
adopted by the lower courts.
Four arguments might be made for limiting gerrymander challenges to racial or ethnic groups. First, it must be acknowledged that
the fourteenth, as well as the fifteenth, amendment was specifically
designed for the protection of the civil rights of the racial minority."
The courts have thus applied the amendment far more exactingly
"' Id. at 56.
n Id. at 58. The case was complicated by the intervention of a group of blacks, including
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, who supported the gerrymander as a means of ensuring
black representation. R. DIxoN, supra note 6, at 465.
"' WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965) (per curiam). Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, emphasized the Court's agreement that partisan gerrymanders are beyond judicial
review. Id. at 6.
1, Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 844-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893
(1972); Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 398 U.S. 901 (1970)
(Cannella, J., concurring); Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739, 833 (D. Del. 1967); Kilgarlin
v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 432-33 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484, 510, 513 (S.D. Tex.
1966); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245, 250 (D. Kan. 1966); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp.
96, 104 (N.D. Ala. 1965).
" Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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where the rights of blacks and other ethnic minorities are involved;"
the rights of other groups might not merit such vigilance. This view
was sometimes espoused by Justice Douglas, who argued in his
Chavis dissent that the racial gerrymander is governed by a separate
constitutional standard.82 Second, the long unchallenged history of
the political gerrymander might be regarded as supporting the view
that the practice is not constitutionally prohibited.,, In one decision
striking down a racial gerrymander, the Court was careful to distinguish the case before it from the "familiar abuses of gerrymandering."84 Third, the difficulty involved in identifying political and
other interest groups makes the nonracial, nongeographic case far
less susceptible to judicial decision than cases such as Reynolds or
Regester. The unstable and ill-defined nature of nonracial groups
makes the courts' line-drawing task less manageable. 5 The fourth
argument, which builds on the first three, is that nonracial gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question. It is argued that a
textually demonstrable commitment to a "coordinate" political
branch may be found in Article I, section 488 and that there is a lack
of judicially manageable standards for enforcement of the group
voting right. 7
Two of the above 4rguments can be answered with little difficulty. The assertion that the political gerrymander occupies a
11See, for example, Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1972), in which the
state districting plan was upheld in part despite its partisan purpose, id. at 926, but partly
overturned because of its effect on Navajo voters, id. at 927.
u It is said that if we prevent racial gerrymandering today, we must prevent gerrymandering of any special interest group tomorrow, whether it be social, economic, or
ideological. I do not agree. Our Constitution has a special thrust when it comes to voting;
the Fifteenth Amendment says the right of citizens to vote shall not be "abridged" on
account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Cousins v. City
Council, 466 F.2d 830, 851 n.18 n.18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (Stevens,
Cir. J., dissenting). Justice Douglas was not entirely consistent. Compare Whitcomb
(Douglas, J., dissenting) with Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). The Court seemed to assume that

partisan political considerations must always be a part of the districting process.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).

To some extent, these difficulties are present in the racial cases as well, since community voting patterns must be determined inorder to establish the discriminatory effect of
the challenged plan and suggested remedies. Allegations of racially polarized voting are a
common feature in the plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1978), prob.juris. noted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-1844); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 622 (5th

Cir. 1975). Moreover, in many cases, examination of past election returns may be a reliable
means of determining the political impact of a given plan. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 738 (1973) (districting plan based on voting patterns in past three elections).
§ 4.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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stronger historical position and is therefore deserving of judicial
deference is simply not convincing. Remnants of the racial discrimination that existed before the first gerrymanders have not been
deemed entitled to special protection from judicial scrutiny.8 Similarly, malapportioned districts in Tennessee had existed for 60 years
before being held to pose a justiciable controversy in Baker v. Carr."
The argument that political gerrymanders lie in an area committed
to a coordinate branch of government is contrary to the language of
Baker that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal
judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the
'political question.' "90 The second part of the political question
objection is somewhat more troublesome. The criteria developed by
the cases following Regester,"1however, would seem to provide manageable standards for claims of nonracial, as well as racial, groups.
Even though the nonjusticiability arguments, in the aggregate,
have some force, the logic of the voting dilution cases impels the
recognition of claims of nonracial groups. For example, in Chavis
the Court acknowledged the difficulty of limiting the concept to its
original racial context:
The District Court's holding, although on the facts of this case
limited to guaranteeing one racial group representation, is not
easily contained. It is expressive of the more general proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command
at least one seat and represents a majority living in an area
sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district.2
The Court rejected the contention that there was a right to
representationof all political groups, but seemed to assume that if
such a right were recognized, it would extend to groups such as
Democrats, Republicans, union workers, university communities,
religious sects, or ethnic groups, if their interests were
"distinctive.' 3 The Court's reasoning implies that a right to
participation, the right acknowledged by the Court in Regester,
should extend to all such groups. Indeed, from the first recognition
See Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 851 n.18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
893 (1972) (Stevens, Cir. J., dissenting).
- 369 U.S. 186, 191-93, 237 (1962).
" Id. at 210.
11 See, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam on
other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
12 403 U.S. at 156 (footnote omitted).
"3Id.
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of the possibility of the voting dilution challenge by a nongeographical group in the Fortson dictum, 4 the message has been repeated:
a districting scheme that "would operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial orpolitical elements of the voting population" might be vulnerable to constitutional attack."
The Court's adjudication of the claim in Gaffney v. Cummings"
provides further support. Connecticut Democrats alleged that the
challenged districting scheme contained "a built-in bias in favor
of the Republican party."' 7 If claims of partisan gerrymanders were
nonjusticiable, or if there were no such cause of action on behalf of
nonracial groups, then the Court should have ordered the cause of
action dismissed. Instead, it heard the merits," noting that
"[w]hat is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political
ends or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.""
The Fifth Circuit, in dictum, recently suggested the justiciability of voting dilution claims by all political groups, discussing discrimination against a racial group as a subclass of gerrymanders
actionable on a voting dilution theory. 10 Addressing the issue more
directly, Judge, now Justice, Stevens, in his dissent in Cousins v.
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
91Id. (emphasis added); accord, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971); Bums
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); cf. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 844 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (noting that thq Fortson dictum no longer represents the
prevailing view of the Court). This view appeared twenty years earlier in Justice Black's
dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566-74 (1946), when he wrote that "legislation
which must inevitably bring about glaringly unequal representation in the Congress in favor
of special classes and groups should be invalidated." Id. at 571. Justice Black interpreted
article I of the Constitution to guarantee that "[a]ll groups, classes, and individuals shall
to the extent that is practically feasible be given equal representation in the House of Representatives." Id. at 570-71.
U 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
,7 Id. at 739.
' Similarly, in Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part sub
noa. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the district court did not question the standing
of a group of Republican voters to challenge the Texas Senate and House districting schemes.
With respect to the Senate districts the court found no evidence of voting dilution; with
respect to the House of Representatives, the court did not reach the issue since it found the
relief requested by the Republicans "subsumed" in the relief granted to the black and
Mexican-American voters. 343 F. Supp. at 734-35.
The Gaffney Court held for the defendants, saying that the "spirit of 'political fairness'
underlying this plan is not only permissible, but a desirable consideration." 412 U.S. at 752.
The plan had been crafted to produce a legislative reflection of the partisan division of the
state.
Id. at 754.
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The issue in dilution cases,
therefore, is not whether a given group elects a minimum number of candidates, and the
standards are not different when. . . the interest binding the group is one of race.").
"1
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City Council,"0 ' argued that, following the Baker v. Carr line of
cases, the rationale of the voting dilution attack on gerrymandering
applies with equal force to ethnic, political, or racial groups.' At
the heart of this position is the recognition that unfettered participation in the political processes is a protected right of all citizens.
As Judge Stevens noted, gerrymandering is by its nature directed
at groups behaving as political factions. "The mere fact that a number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create the need for protection against gerrymandering. . . .[T]he characteristic of the group which creates the need
for protection is its political character." 103 To grant blacks, as a
political group, more protection than others as political groups
amounts to unfair treatment that could itself be characterized as
"invidious". 04
This expansive view of the groups protected under the voting
dilution theory does not mean that any group, no matter how
small, S5 or how thinly spread throughout the political jurisdiction,"'0
may state a cause of action for unconstitutional gerrymandering.
Rather, it is limited to those groups that have enough members to
control at least one district and are geographically situated to allow
a practicable redrawing of district lines to increase their political
power. 01 These limitations, coupled with the stiff requirements of
, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (Stevens, Cir. J., dissenting).
466 F.2d at 851.
"* Id. at 852. See City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd mem. 410 U.S. 962 (1973); Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the
Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 590 n.106 (1978).
To say that racial minorities must be distinct political factions is not necessarily to say
that their views on most political issues must diverge from those of other voters. A racial
minority alleging dilution may agree with other voters on most questions of public policy and
disagree only on which candidates it favors, and may favor different candidates only because
they are members of the same racial minority. In such a situation, the race of candidates is
a political issue dividing voters into factions.
1" 466 F.2d at 852 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Note, supra note 103, arguing that
only groups cognizable under the fifteenth amendment should have a right to representation.
'0 See Lipscomb v. Wise, 551 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
98 S. Ct. 2493 (1978); Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
I" In Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975), the claim of Puerto Rican voters in Chicago that their voting stength had been
diminished by means of unconstitutional gerrymandering was rejected because the members
of the group were so scattered among three or four wards that it would be impossible to create
a Puerto Rican majority ward. Id. at 921.
19 Cf. Whiteomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 156 (denying a right to representationto such
groups). In Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975), black
voters, comprising six percent of the electorate, were held unable to state a voting dilution
claim.
"
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the plaintiff's case, 10 should prevent the undue proliferation of litigation.
I.

ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE

The elements of the voting dilution case were described in
Regester:
The plaintiffs burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and
election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question - that its members had less opportunity than did
other residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice."'
The Court demanded more than the mere showing that the group
allegedly discriminated against had not had legislative seats in proportion to its size as a voting bloc,110 but failed to articulate the
relevance of the additional requirements set forth. Application of
this test suggested in Regester has often proceeded without a clear
recognition of the ultimate issue in the case. The courts have not
known whether to require the plaintiff to show a diminution of
voting power, a pattern of racial discrimination, or both. This confusion has led to uncertainty about the types and weight of evidence
relevant to the elements of the test.
A principled resolution of the voting dilution cases proceeds
from a recognition that the ultimat6 issue is whether the political
power possessed by a particular group is less than would be indicated by its numbers, and less than it would be with different district boundaries. Political power, as used here, is measured by influence on the nomination and election of candidates and the responsiveness of public officials to the interests and opinions of the
See pt. m infra.
412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). In setting forth the standards that underlie these cases,
the Supreme Court was cautious not to lay down a rigid formula for decision. Instead, the
Court upheld the findings of the district court, "representing as they do a blend of history
and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the ... multimember district
in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." Id. at 769-70.
III Id. at 765-66. But cf. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (proportional representation as measure of equality of access under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1973c (1974)). The lower courts have consistently recognized that "it is not enough to prove
mere disparity between the number of minority residents and the number of minority representatives." Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam on
other grounds sub. noam. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976);
accord, Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 968 (1977); Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 508 F.2d 1109,1112 (5th Cir. 1975).
'"
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group."' This diminution of political power, however, must be some-

thing more than a demonstration that were district lines drawn
differently, the political fortunes of the group would be improved.
Rather, the group must show a "substantial" impairment of its
political power; it must demonstrate "some fundamental unfairness
in the electoral system.""'
Understood in this way, there are two parts to the plaintiffs'
required showing. First, plaintiffs must show that the challenged
plan significantly diminishes their influence, as a group, on election
results. Second, they must show that this diminution of political
influence is not compensated for in other stages of the political
and the behavior
process: for example, the nomination of candidates
3
of officials toward the groups after election.1

A. The Group's Influence at the Polls
In Regester, the Court found a diminution in electoral influence
of blacks in Dallas from the facts that only two blacks, both whitesupported, had been elected to the Texas House of Representatives
from Dallas since Reconstruction, and that a white-dominated organization that employed racial campaign tactics in white precincts
so controlled Dallas elections that it did not need the support of the
black community." 4 The organization thus did not "exhibit good
faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the
Negro community."" 5 Especially where there are two hostile voting
blocs in a community, the central issue will often be the inability
of members or allies of one group to be elected. One court has noted
that the allegation that no black has been elected to the city council
because of the at-large system "may in itself indicate that minorities have been denied an equal influence in the political process."",
The election of isolated members of the minority need not, however,
be decisive against the plaintiffs," 7 nor does the lack of elected
"I See generally Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam
on othergrounds sub noam. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
M Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S.

947 (1976).
113As a practical matter, plaintiffs' right to relief will also depend on their ability to show
that another plan can be designed that will provide them with a fair share of political power.
See text and notes at notes 238-43 infra.
11,412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15 Id. at 767.
" Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 48 (7th Cir. 1975).
M1Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (without
approving the constitutional holding of the appellate court).
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members of the minority - without more - establish the voting
dilution claim."'
Where there are more than two identifiable political groups
making up the electorate, a simple comparison of the population of
the group with its numbers of elected officials is particularly inadequate to determine the group's influence at the polls. If a minority
voting bloc is in a position to determine the outcome among candidates of other opposing factions, it may wield decisive political
power. Those candidates will need to demonstrate attention to the
minority's concerns in order to win its critical votes."'
To calculate a group's ability to affect election results, a court
would have to count the number of "safe" districts controlled by the
group and increase that figure by some fraction of the districts in
which the group sometimes wins and those where the group is able
to command the attention of other candidates. 20 Any shortfall in
voting influence must be proven attributable to the challenged
12
plan. '
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have noted several factors that
will enhance a claim of voting dilution: districts that are especially
large, 22 or non-compact, 2 3 majority vote requirements,1 2 4 antisingle-shot voting provisions, ir and the lack of provision for at-large
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 153.
See Greater Houston Civic Council v. Mann, 440 F. Supp. 696,700 (S.D. Tex.) (1977)
("to disestablish the present order in favor of singlp district representation would necessarily
strip the minorities of a goodly measure of their current city wide political potency").
"I See Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975), where the court counted districts with large black minorities as representing black
political strength. See also Panior v. berville Parish School Bd., 536 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir.
1976) (considering the impact on election outcomes of substantial black minorities in districts); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974)
(invalidating a plan creating black majorities in all districts because the thinness of the
majorities might perpetuate white control); Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453
F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (approving a plan where the 48 percent
black minority controlled one safe seat out of five, constituted half of anothes district, and
close to half of a third, even though plaintiffs' proposal would have created two safe black
seats); Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976) (blacks were found to wield
political power by being a large minority in every official's constituency).
"I Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 48 (7th Cir. 1975) (effect must be "as a result of
the method of apportionment"); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated
on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976) (plan must be a "tool" of racial discrimination); Taylor
v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff must show a "nexus" between
district lines and the denial of access to the political process).
In Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at
143.
' Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 922 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975).
"IUZimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305. See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766.
In Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 624 (1975), vacated on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 947
'
"'
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candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts.16
These factors all suggest that the plan has the effect of depriving a
minority of its opportunity to exert influence at the polls. Proof that
the plan grants a group less influence at the polls than is warranted
by its proportionate population share is not decisive, however. The
fourteenth amendment does not protect groups from losing elections, where their rights to meaningful participation in other facets
of the political processes are unimpaired.'2 7
B.

Participation in the Political Processes

The test for voting dilution developed by the lower courts, particularly the Fifth Circuit, goes beyond a surface comparison of size
of population to number of representatives, and beyond other overt
manifestations of electoral power, to evaluate whether a group exerts political power at earlier and later stages of the political process.121 The most often cited explication of the requirements of
Regester is the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Zimmer v. McKeithen,1 9
which sets forth the criteria for establishing voting dilution.
The Fifth Circuit test consists of four principal factors, the
13
1 30
aggregate of which will establish the claim. First, the plaintiffs '
may prove an exclusion from the process of slating candidates. The
evidence may be particularly important where one political party is
dominant and the primary is effectively the election. 32 Where there
is an open primary system without party endorsement, there is no
exclusion from the slating process. 33 If the minority group participates fully and effectively in the candidate selection of a major
party, it may be inferred that its underrepresentation is a result of
(1976); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305.
I' Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at
144-45.
' Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 153.
'12 Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305; Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th
Cir. 1977). See 87 HAxv. L. REy. 1851 (1974). See also Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) (demonstrating that not
all four factors listed in text infra need be proven).
'I 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam on othergroundssub noma.
East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
' 485 F.2d at 1305.
131The plaintiffs need not be a minority in the strict sense, but merely a politically
disadvantaged group. Id. at 1303-04.
"1 Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 150-51 with White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
at 766-67. See also Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S.
947 (1976).
"3 McGill v. Gadsen County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1976). Evidence of this
kind would be particularly important in establishing claims of nonracial groups.
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voter apathy or poor political organization, rather than of voting
dilution.

Second, plaintiffs may show that the legislators elected are not
responsive to the group's interests. Hostility of government officials
toward the group,13 discriminatory provision of government services, 35 or discrimination in government hiring are indicative of such
unresponsiveness. 13 Since public officials serve a variety of functions, it is important not to ignore the possibility that a representative whose voting record appears uncongenial to a group may be
responsive in other ways. The responsiveness factor may be of small
weight in hard cases, 137 both because of difficulties of proois and
because of the possible impropriety of judicial scrutiny of the performance of elected officials.131 Perhaps most important, because it

is difficult to predict how responsive future officials will be," ° no
districting plan making significant changes can be evaluated in
terms of responsiveness.

Third, plaintiffs may establish that the policy underlying the
districting scheme is "tenuous," '' making plausible the inference

that the scheme is merely a pretext for shutting the minority out
from power. 4 2 State policies in favor of multimember districts,"'
lu Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1129-31, 1140-41 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (officials uncooperative in implementing desegregation).
01 Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1974); cf. Dove v. Bumpers,
364 F. Supp. 407, 410-12 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (finding no discrimination in services), vacated,
497 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Bonapfel, suipra note 36 at 379-87 (1976).
lu Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d
923, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1977).
In See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1306. But see Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209,
223 n.19 (5th Cir. 1978).
lu In some cases, especially involving racial minorities in the South, the proof is not
difficult; the record is "clear and stark." See, e.g., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d
139, 143-44 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Reese v. Dallas County,
505 F.2d 879, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1974).
"' Referring to judicial investigation into the performance of legislators, Justice Harlan
remarked: "If there are less appropriate subjects for federal judicial inquiry, they do not come
readily to mind." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 170 (Harlan, J., concurring).
'"See, e.g., Van Cleave v. Town of Gibsland, 380 F. Supp. 135, 138 (W.D. La. 1974).
14 The "tenuousness" of the state policy may more properly be viewed as a response to
the defendant's affirmative defense. See text and notes at notes 167-70 infra. The Fifth
Circuit, however, seems not to distinguish the factor from other parts of plaintiff's case. See,
e.g., Nevett v. Sides 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
"2 Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
district lines were redrawn after the election of the firstblack precinct captain); cf. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (long-standing policy of multimember districts in two cities
overturned); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 947 (1976)
(long-standing state policy in favor of at-large elections supported retention of a swing seat
elected at large).
"1 Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1976).
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preserving historical political boundaries, 14 and preserving the districts of incumbents deserve judicial deference.' 45 Other policies,
such as the equalization of road and bridge mileage, may carry little
weight.4 6 Where the policies are of recent vintage, they are generally
47
considered to be tenuous.'
Fourth, plaintiffs might prove the existence of past discrimination against the group, making it more likely that the plan operates
to disadvantage them in the exercise of their vote.'4 1 It is often
difficult to decide how much weight to give to past, discontinued
discriminatory policies. 49 When these past policies retain present
effect, however, such as a dearth of minority members registered to
vote,' 51 they are still significant. Courts will often look to discrimination in the private sector, as well as by government, 5' but the most
important evidence is of discrimination which "touched the right of
[the group] to register and vote and to participate in the democratic processes."'5 2 Yet, finding that past discrimination has caused
a present diminution in voting power does not necessitate finding
voting dilution.'5" The Fifth Circuit has properly recognized that a
shift in the burden of proof is appropriate where plaintiffs have
established a history of past discrimination. Defendants should
then bear the burden of proving that the incidents of past discrimination have been removed, at least where the discrimination is not
remote in time.' 54 Otherwise, plaintiffs would have to prove not
14 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 162 n.42; cf. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182
(1971) (some mathematical inexactness acceptable in apportionment given such a policy, in
absence of allegation of any bias for or against any group).
"1 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973); Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 917
& n.llb (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
', Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 151 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 968 (1977). But see Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 625 (5th
Cir. 1974) (equalization of road mileage and land area called "extremely important here").
", See cases cited in note 142 supra.
" White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67. See also United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (approving a districting plan which represented "no racial slur or
stigma" against the plaintiff group).
1, See, e.g., Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 508 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485

F.2d at 1305.
"I E.g., Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 49 (7th Cir. 1975) (all-white private schools
and employment discrimination).
"u White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766.
15 McGill v. Gadsen County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 144-45 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). Kirksey in part justified placing the burden on defendants to
show that past discrimination has ended by making reference to school desegregation decisions. 554 F.2d at 145 n.12. The Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. 9f
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971), held that "in a system with a history of segregation the need
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only past, but also future denial of access to the political process.
The Fifth Circuit has also relieved plaintiffs of the burden of proving that economic and educational deprivation has significant poli55
tical effect. The court will infer this causal connection.
Participation in the political process does not include sham
opportunities or rigged contests. Only where participation has a
reasonable chance to build political influence does it satisfy the
56
demands of the fourteenth amendment. In Turner v. McKeithen,1
for example, it was shown that blacks were consulted in the candidate slating process, but only "at a stage when the actual candidate
selection ha[d] already occurred and the possibility for meaningful
influence . . . [was] significantly diminished." 51 The core evil is
the denial of political power; the insistence on proof of unequal
opportunity to participate ensures that the analysis will take into
account all methods of exercising that power.
C.

Affirmative Defenses

If the plainiffs have established a prima facie case of significant 5"' 8 voting dilution, defendants may raise the affirmative defense
of legitimate governmental purpose,'59 such as preservation of traditional voting boundaries, protection of incumbents, equalization of
land area, or maintenance of longstanding at-large or multimember
voting schemes. The cases do not specify, however, what degree of
scrutiny is appropriate in evaluating these various governmental
policies. Some lower courts, applying the two-tier analysis of such
for remedial criteria. . . warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in racial composition." A similar presumption can be applied to redistricting
plans where a minority controls the outcome in a disproportionately small number of dis-

tricts. Defendants cannot rebut proof of previous denial of access by the naked dssertion that
now and henceforth the electoral process is equally open to members of the plaintiff's group.
But see Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 227 n.26 (5th Cir. 1978); Cousins v. City Council, 503
F.2d 912, 922-24 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
INId. at 145.
IN 490 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973).
I" Id. at 195.

I Just as small deviations from population equality are tolerated without justification
in state reapportionment cases, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1963) ("Mathematical

exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) ("minor deviations from mathematical equality among state
legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment."), insignificant dilutions of the voting power of groups
will not give rise to a claim, see, e.g., Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).

10 Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 736-52 (1973) (justifications for deviation
from population equality). The point at which the burden shifts to the defendant depends
on whether a showing of intent is held to be a part of the plaintiff's case. See Part IV infra.
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cases as San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,,"0
have applied only minimum scrutiny.' The Seventh Circuit, for
example, analyzed the language of the Supreme Court voting dilution cases and concluded that "the 'strict scrutiny' test has not been
applied in racial gerrymandering cases."'' 2 It can be argued that,
whether the voting dilution cases are viewed as an abridgement of
the "fundamental"
right to vote,16 3 or as discrimination against a
"suspect class", 6 ' policies that result in voting dilution must be
strictly scrutinized to determine whether there is a compelling state
interest to justify the challenged plan. As a practical proposition,
however, most courts appear to have adopted a sliding scale approach:' justification required varies inversely with the extent of
the variation from equality of voting power, with the courts accepting virtually no policy as adequate justification for very large deviations.'
The strength of various affirmative defenses is thus determined
largely by the particular factual situation and the degree of diminution of voting power involved. Some patterns do emerge from the
cases, however. At-large election plans designed by an elected body,
which arguably have the effect of avoiding destructive political fragmentation and forcing officials to consider the good of the wider
community, are often upheld if they have been in effect for a long
period of time."7 Similarly, the preservation of existing, traditional,
ZN

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

s Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 923 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992

(1975); Dunn v. Oklahoma, 343 F. Supp. 320, 330 (D. Okla. 1972). But see Reese v. Dallas
County, 505 F.2d 879, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 477 (1975)
(applying strict scrutiny).
" Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 923 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975), citing, inter alia, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
10 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); L. Tams, supra note
6, at §§ 16-7, 16-10.
I" Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See generally L. TmBE,supra
note 6, at §§ 16-13 to 16-29.
1" Mr. Justice Marshall has suggested that the Court has applied a "spectrum of standards" depending on the importance of the interest asserted, the character of the classification, and the state interests in support of the classification. San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (dissenting opinion). See generally Gunther,
Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Karst, Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. Rzv. 1 (1977).
I" See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
',That a multimember plan has been in effect for a long period of time aids in rebutting
the charge that it is a pretext for discrimination. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149;
Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1977); Dove v. Bumpers, 364 F. Supp.
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or convenient voting district boundaries has served to justify deviations from the ideal,'6 8 partly because familiar boundaries are
thought to promote efficient government by making it easier for
voters to discover where they vote and who represents them. The
equalization of land area and road mileage, on the other hand, is an
example of a "legitimate planning objective""' ' that has frequently
not withstood judicial scrutiny. 7 '
IV.

THE INTENT REQUIREMENT

A crucial, and as yet unresolved question is whether plaintiffs
bringing a voting dilution claim must prove discriminatory intent.
Neither Regester nor Zimmer addresses the issue of intent, and
lower courts have incorporated inconsistent formulations of an in-

tent requirement in their gerrymander decisions. In Cousins v. City
Council,' the Seventh Circuit painstakingly combed the record for
evidence of a "purpose of diluting or minimizing the voting power"
7 2 The Fifth Circuit cases, in
of plaintiff racial and ethnic groups.Y
contrast, have until recently allowed plaintiffs
to prove either dis73

criminatory intent or discriminatory effect.
These two approaches to intent represent differing views of the
source and rationale of the voting dilution cause of action. The
approach adopted in Cousins reflects the view that gerrymander
407, 413 (E.D. Ark. 1973). But see Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975); Wallace
v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 632 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
I"See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971);
Panior v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 536 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1976).
I"Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). See also Moore v. Leflore County Bd.of Election Comm'rs, 502
F.2d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 680
(5th Cir. 1974).
" Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1974). But
see Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
I Id. at 841. See also the later decision in Cousins, 503 F.2d 912, 916-20 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206, 213-15 (N.D. Miss.
1975); United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943, 946-47 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901, 904-05 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified on other grounds,
386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).
In E.g., Panior v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 536 F.2d 101, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1976);
Ferguson v. Winn Parish Police Jury, 528 F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1976); Wallace v. House,
515 F.2d 619, 622-23 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976); Zimmer
v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'dper curiamon othergrounds sub nom.
East Carroll Parish School Bd.v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Howard v. Adams County
Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 457-58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). These
cases have applied the concept of discriminatory effect as a substantial impairment of political power. See text and note at note 112 supra.
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challenges are grounded on a racial discrimination theory,", while
the Fifth Circuit cases have relied on the Fortsondictum that plans
which "designedly or otherwise . . . operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population"'' 5 are susceptible to constitutional challenge. This latter view of the role of intent, which the Supreme Court reemphasized in Burns v. Richardson,171 was construed by the Fifth Circuit
as reducing intent to a sufficient, but not a necessary, element of
the cause of action. In two recent cases, 77 however, the Fifth Circuit
doctrine has undergone a change. In response to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Washington v. Davis7 1 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.,171 insisting on
proof of racially discriminatory intent in equal protection cases, the
Fifth Circuit has held that "a showing of racially motivated discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection voting dilution
claim." 0
In Davis, the disproportionate impact of a personnel test on
blacks was insufficient to render the test unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment. The Court held that racially discriminatory
intent must be proved. 8 ' Similarly, in Arlington Heights, intent was
held a necessary element in a challenge to allegedly discriminatory
zoning practices. 8 The reasoning in these two cases is broad and not
easily confined: "[Tihe invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."1'
The Fifth Circuit supported its application of Davis and
Arlington Heights to voting dilution cases on two separate grounds.
Judge Godbold, writing for the en banc majority in Kirksey v. Board
of Supervisors,'84 asserted that the intent standard adopted by the
Supreme Court was fully consistent with the Court's earlier decisions in Chavis and Regester. According to the court, plaintiffs in

III

See 466 F.2d at 841. Significantly, the Cousins majority rejected the claim of dilution
by a political group. Id. at 844-45.
I' 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (emphasis added).

171384

U.S. 73, 88, 89 (1966).

In Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
I's 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
"7 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

INNevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 219 (5th Cir. 1978).
"

426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

I

429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977).

"3
'u

426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
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the former case lost because they had alleged only discriminatory
effects, while in the latter case plaintiffs had established intent
through the demonstration of denial of access.' Kirksey thus
viewed Davis and Arlington Heights as in no way suggesting that
Regester was not "alive and well." 1 " In Nevett v. Sides,8 ' the Fifth
Circuit found more direct support in the language of Davis. The
Davis Court discussed with approval its earlier decision in Wright
v. Rockefeller,""8 in which the Court had denied plaintiffs' claim
because of their failure to demonstrate either that the challenged
districts were drawn along racial lines or were motivated by racial
considerations.1 8 The Nevett court concluded that this
"reaffirmation" of Wright "leaves no doubt that a showing of intent
is a necesary element in a case alleging a racial gerrymander." ' "
Moreover, because the Arlington Heights Court categorized Wright
as an "election districting" case,"' and because the Fifth Circuit
regarded the racial gerrymander at issue in Wright as indistinguishable from the voting dilution cases,19 2 the Nevett court found
the intent requirement applicable to all voting dilution claims.
Based on its conclusion that Regester had required a showing
of intent, the Nevett court held that the criteria developed in
Zimmer provide a sufficient basis for the inference of intent.9 3 The
court explained how each of the Zimmer criteria speaks to intent:
denial of voter registration or access to the slating process indicates
that the minority's lack of influence is not adventitious, but intentional; unresponsiveness of officials resulting from impediments to
minority political participation supports an inference of discriminatory purpose;9 5 "tenuous" legislative policy suggests an impermissible underlying purpose; ' and past discrimination against a minority group suggests that maintenance of such discrimination underlies a putatively neutral districting scheme." By equating a finding
of dilution under Zimmer with satisfaction of the intent require'"Id. at 148.
l" Id. n.17.
1' 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
lu 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
18 426 U.S. at 240.
N 571 F.2d at 218. Judge Tjoflat also agreed with Kirksey's assessment of Regester and
Chavis. Id. at 219 n.13.
M 429 U.S. at 265.
1 571 F.2d at 219.
Id. at 222-25.
' Id. at 223.
,"Id.at 223 n.19.
" Id. at 224.
I" See id. at 222.
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ment of Davis, the court was able to support the result, while undermining the reasoning, of a series of prior Fifth Circuit voting dilution decisions. 9 ' Since each of these cases found dilution under the
Zimmer criteria, each necessarily established the essential element
of intent.'99 Thus, while the test for voting dilution is unchanged, the
Fifth Circuit now views the ultimate issue addressed by the Zimmer
test to be discriminatory intent, not the denial of access to the
political process.
Satisfaction of the Fifth Circuit's current intent requirement is
not limited to the inference of discriminatory intent in the enactment of a challenged districting scheme. If, as in Kirksey, the plan
is facially neutral but carries forward a pattern of intentional discrimination, the Nevett majority would regard the necessary element of intent to be present.2 0 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in
Bolden v. City of Mobile,2 ' held that legislative inaction that maintains an existing discriminatory districting scheme-even if the
2
plan was neutral at its inception-provides the requisite intent.11
The Nevett court read Davis as supporting the conclusion that discriminatory impact need only be traced to some discriminatory intent.2 3 In both of the above situations, the court noted in Nevett,
application of the Zimmer criteria is probative of intent.
Judge Wisdom, concurring specially in Nevett, rejected the
majority's conclusion that Davis and Arlington Heights impose an
intent requirement in voting dilution cases and objected to their
reading of the voting dilution precedents. He found both arguments
for the intent requirement unconvincing: Regester and Chavis did
not require proof of discriminatory intent, and Davis and Arlington
Heights did not advert to, and thus did not modify, the voting
dilution cases. 20 ' At the heart of Judge Wisdom's argument lay his
contention that voting rights cases are distinguishable from all other
equal protection cases.2 0 Returning to the source of the voting dilution doctrine, Reynolds v. Sims, he noted that restriction of the
right to vote, which may be challenged without showing intent,
"'

See note 173 supra and cases cited at 571 F.2d 209, 225 (5th Cir. 1978).

"' 571 F.2d at 225.

Id. at 222.
571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), prob.juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No.
77-1844).
"2 Id. at 246.
20 571 F.2d at 219-20 n.13.
2" Id. at 232.
2" Id. at 233. He based this distinction on the notion that the right to vote is "a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." Id. (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
2I
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results from qualitative as well as quantitative dilution of citizens'
votes. Because he regarded the voting dilution claim as a distinct
constitutional doctrine, Judge Wisdom had no problem severing the
Davis Court's approval of the intent requirement in Wright v.
Rockefeller, which, although occurring in the context of Voting
rights, was analyzed as a racial discrimination claim, from the voting rights cases brought under a voting dilution theory.2
Judge Wisdom was concerned that the shift in theory from a
requirement of proof of invidious effects to proof of intent would
have the practical effect of significantly impeding the ability of
plaintiffs to succeed in voting dilution cases, and would, in fact,
contract the scope of the cause of action. That the cause of action
itself might be limited by the intent requirement follows from Judge
Wisdom's reading of Davis. Where discriminatory purpose is adduced only on the basis of a failure to affirmatively cure past discrimination-a situation in which the Zimmer criteria have been
found satisfied2 1 and which the majority would find implies intent-a finding of intent would be "inconsistent" with Davis.2
Judge Wisdom warned that the process of inferring intent from a
"laundry list" of factors would cause voting dilution cases to turn
on judges' attitudes toward the "American brand of Federalism." 2
He therefore concluded:
The safe and sure test for the constitutionality of a voting plan
is proof of invidious effects, such as the failure to give due
weight to votes of members of a minority group. When there is
clear proof of this effect, I disapprove of resorting to a douser
factors
to divine whether under an "aggregate" of surface
2
there is an unconstitutional legislative motive. 1
If, as the Nevett majority suggests, a finding of dilution under
the Zimmer criteria necessarily supports the inference of improper
intent, the debate between the majority and Judge Wisdom would
be largely academic. It appears, however, that the shift in theory
will in fact result in different contours for the substantive law of
voting dilution.
Judge Wisdom is probably correct in his assertion that in those
cases where intent must be inferred, judges may be less willing to
2" 571

F.2d at 236.

See text and notes at notes 198-99 supra.
571 F.2d 209, 233 (5th Cir. 1978).
2"Id.
211 Id. at 234.
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hold that the Zimmer test has been satisfied."' More significantly,
the Nevett majority's conclusion that intent may be found in the
failure to remedy some past intentional discrimination may be, as
Judge Wisdom asserted, incompatible with Davis and Arlington
Heights. The majority's position suggests that the requisite intent
need not be found in official action at all, so long as the discriminatory effect is attributable to the discriminatory intent of someone-perhaps the community at large. Such intent might have been
found in both Davis and Arlington Heights, 212 yet in neither case did
the Court suggest that the requisite intent could be so remote. If the
source of the constitutional violation is the plan itself, then the plan
must be shown to be conceived or maintained with improper purpose. Under this formulation of the intent requirement, some cases
otherwise satisfying Zimmer would fail to demonstrate the requisite
intent. 13 Thus, an intent requirement may well have the effect of
narrowing the scope of the voting dilution cause of action.
24
It is possible that Regester, as the Nevett majority asserted,
did include an intent requirement. If so, the use of the Zimmer
criteria to establish intent, applied within the bounds of Davis and
Arlington Heights, would reconcile the voting dilution claim with
current equal protection doctrine. 215 The statement of the plaintiffs'
I Although Judge Wisdom's concern about federal judges' deference to the states, id.
at 233, is not a persuasive argument against an intent requirement, the observation that
judges will hesitate to impose the label of intentional discrimination on state legislatures is
a valid one.
212 The Court could have traced the disproportionate impact of the race-neutral test for
police officers to deliberate discrimination in education and the economy, which contributed
to the inability of many blacks to pass the test. Similarly, the Court could have found the
disproportionate impact of the race-neutral zoning ordinance in the racial discrimination that
contributes to the relative poverty of blacks.
211 See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-1844). In Bolden, the court found that because
there was evidence of pervasive past discrimination and because the Zimmer criteria were
satisfied, maintenance of an otherwise race-neutral plan exhibited the requisite discriminatory intent. Id. at 244-46. The court cited Kirksey for the proposition that a plan is impermissible if it perpetuates past discrimination. Id. at 246. The court thus appears to have confused
the standard of review for a court-ordered plan (Kirksey) with that for challenges to legislative
plans (Bolden). See note 229 infra.
211 571 F.2d 209, 219-20 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978).
"I If an intent requirement is to be applied to voting dilution cases, the NevettZimmer
test is not the only conceivable approach. It is established that racial motivation need not
be the sole, or even the primary reason for the districting plan, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 265; discriminatory purpose need only be one motivating factor. Id. at 265-66. Courts have
taken at least two other positions on what form of proof suffices to establish intent. The first,
and strictest, of these alternatives focuses on the motive of the legislature. This approach,
taken by the court in Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 834-37 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 893 (1972), emphasizes direct evidence of the subjective purposes of individual
legislators. Such an evidentiary standard, which can be met only in the most blatant cases,
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case in Regester, however, focuses on proof of discriminatory effects.
"The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings
that the political process leading to nomination and election were
not equally open to participation by the group in question.
... "I
No intent requirement is appended to this summary of plaintiffs'
burden of proof, and the Court's decision appears to have relied on
evidence of intent only insofar as it served to establish discriminatory impact.217 "The District Court . . conclude[d] that the multimember districts, as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation

in political life .

..

",218

Imposing an intent requirement on voting dilution challenges
to gerrymanders would misconstrue the nature of the right protected
in Regester. Intent is relevant where a governmental policy is alleged to impact differentially on a suspect class, not where the legislature is under an obligation to allocate a right or benefit equally to
all citizens . 21 The distinction can be explained as one between the
"right to equal treatment" and the "right to treatment as an
equal". 22 The right to equal treatment applies only to "a limited set
of interests-like voting-and demands that every person have the
same access to these interests as every other person"; 221 the right to
treatment as an equal applies in all cases and reflects the government's general obligation to treat its citizens with "equal concern
is more restrictive than that envisioned by the Court in Arlington Heights. It is unlikely future
courts would limit their inquiry to direct evidence. The second approach, employing the torts
principle that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his actions, was
suggested by Justice Stevens's concurrence in Davis. 426 U.S. at 253. See also Brown v.
Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1136-39 (S.D. Ala. 1976). Under this approach, plaintiffs would
have the relatively light burden of proving that the challenged plan could reasonably be
predicted to have the effect of diminishing the voting strength of the plaintiff group. Though
analytically appealing, this approach probably would not satisfy the Arlington Heights Court,
which said that "impact of the official action" would support an inference of intent only in
the rare cases where the pattern is "stark." 429 U.S. at 266.
21,

412 U.S. at 766.

But see L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at § 16-18, at 1028-29 (Regester suggests that both
effects and intent must be shown).
27
2"

412 U.S. at 769.

"'

See generally L. TRms, supra note 6, at § 16-7.
The distinction is drawn by Ronald Dworkin, R. DwoRKIN, TAKXING RIGHTS SEIuOUSLY

227 (1977); Dworkin, Social Sciences and ConstitutionalRights-The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & Enuc. 3, 10-11 (1977), and adopted by Laurence Tribe, supranote 6,
at § 16-1, at 992-93.
22 L. TRIBE, supranote 6, at § 16-1, at 992-93. Professor Tribe, drawing on Dworkin, notes
that the right to equal treatment cannot apply to all interests since "any such universal
demand for sameness would prevent government from discriminating in the public interest."
Id. at 993.
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and respect." 2s When equal protection cases are categorized in this
way, it becomes clearer that a single intent standard is inappropriate. The right to equal treatment is defined in terms of the effect
on the individual of governmental action. The equal concern and
respect inherent in the right to treatment as an equal, on the other
hand, necessarily involves the attitude and motive underlying legislative action: discriminatory impact may be relevant evidence that
the government has failed to treat all citizens fairly, but intent is
the essential element of the claim.
Thus, Davis and Arlington Heights can and should be distinguished from the voting dilution cause of action, which is grounded
in the fundamental right to vote. In Reynolds the Court did not hold
that each citizen has the right to be protected from intentional
malapportionment, but that he has a substantive right to districts
drawn within certain population variances. 221 Similarly, granting

some voters greater power because of their political affiliation
should never be permissible. Judge Wisdom correctly included voting dilution cases within a category distinct from other equal protection cases. The rationale of the voting dilution claim has been demonstrated to derive from (and to be qualitatively indistinguishable
from) the theory of the one man, one vote mandate of Reynolds.m
Legislative action challenged on the ground that it has a greater
negative impact on one race than another must, after Davis, generally be shown to be intentinally discriminatory to be overturned; a
legislative action allocating the political power incident to the right
to vote need only be shown to have allocated that power unequally.2
The question remains whether the Court intended in Davis and
222Dworkin, supranote 220, at 10.
2 See text and notes at notes 53-54 supra. By contrast, where the legislature is engaged
in making an arguably permissible classification among citizens-as, for example, by zoning
or by setting qualifications for employment-the plaintiff must challenge the classification
as being racially motivated.
m See text and notes at notes 53-66 supra.
msBut see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79

YALz L.J. 1205 (1970). Professor Ely argues that political districting falls within the class of
governmental distinctions which are necessarily arbitrary. Merely because one person is
disadvantaged relative to another by the choice of district boundaries does not, in his view,
subject the plan to constitutional scrutiny. Rather, the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from employing improper criteria in drawing the lines. To trigger scrutiny, therefore, it
is necessary to prove that the legislature drew up the plan with discriminatory intent. His
analysis preceded the decisions in Chavis, Regester,Davis, and Arlington Heights. See id. at
1230-37, 1249-66. An analogy might be drawn to school desegregation cases: mere racial
disproportion, de facto, is not sufficient to require desegregation action; only where de jure
segregation is found to have existed does the plaintiff win a desegregation case. See id. at
1289-98.
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Arlington Heights to alter the requirements of the plaintiffs case.
The answer depends on whether the Court's endorsement of Wright
v. Rockefeller in both opinions can be regarded as speaking to the
voting dilution cause of action. The Nevett majority insisted that
it can be, since they saw no distinction between the racial gerrymander alleged in Wright and the districting schemes challenged by the
voting dilution cases. The problem with this reasoning is that although the contexts may be analogous, the theory on which Wright
was brought is distinguishable from the voting dilution theory as it
has subsequently developed. Plaintiffs in Wright brought the case
on the ground that they were the victims of an intentional, racially
segregative districting scheme."' Since the Court, at the time it
decided Wright, had not yet upheld a voting dilution claim (or even
recognized the possibility of such a claim in the single-member
district context), it would have been incongruous to go beyond the
plaintiffs' theory in that case to do so. A more reasonable explanation of Davis's citation of Wright is that the Court merely sought to
establish a broad range of contexts in which the Court had previously required a showing of intent to sustain racial discrimination
claims alleging violation of the right to treatment as an equal.2
V.

COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES

When a court strikes down an existing state districting scheme,
it will, "whenever practicable," allow the legislature to redraw districting boundaries rather than impose its own plan. 22 If, because
of legislative -inaction, a court is compelled to devise a districting
plan to remedy voting dilution,22 9 that plan is held to.a higher

2"See text and notes at notes 67-77 supra. The Court noted that plaintiffs had argued
before the District Court that "the only province of the Court in this area is to determine
whether or not these districts have been created with racial considerations in mind." 376 U.S.
at 54. The Court expressly addressed only the issue, stated in appellants' jurisdictional
statement to the Court, "[wihether appellants sustained their burden of proving that [the
statute]. . . segregates eligible voters by race and place of origin." Id. at 56.
2" See 426 U.S. at 238-41.
2n Wise v. Lipscomb, 98 S. Ct. 2493, 2497 (1978). This follows from the Court's oftrepeated statement that redistricting and reapportionment are legislative tasks. See id. and
cases cited therein.
In The precise scope of plans regarded as "court-ordered" has apparently changed following the Court's decision in Wise. The Court distinguished plans submitted to and
"adopted" by a court from those adopted by a legislative body and subsequently submitted
to and approved by the court. Id. at 2499-500. An example of the first case, said the Court,
was the plan reviewed in East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), in
which the legislative bodies submitting the plans "did not purport to reapportion themselves
and, furthermore, could not even legally do so under federal law." Wise v. Lipscomb, 98 S.
Ct. 2493, 2500 (1978). Apparently any plan adopted by a legislative body and "effective as
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standard than a corresponding legislative enactment. 21° A courtordered plan must affirmatively remedy the denial of access that
was found in the existing districting plan; a plan that does not ensure equality of voting power will be ruled "an abuse of [the
court's] discretion." 3 ' The duty of the court should be distinguished from that in racial discrimination cases in which the remedies need only eliminate the effects of past discrimination and bar
like discrimination in the future. 2 The right to participate in the
electoral process, like the right to voting district population equality
is a continuing affirmative right to a fair share of political influence.
Thus, while there is no continuing right to integrated schools recognized in school desegregation cases, 23 3 voting districts must be
drawn to protect, to the fullest extent possible, the future ability of
a group to exert political power.
United Jewish Organizationsv. Carey234 cast doubt on the argument that legislatures or courts must be race-neutral in the drawing
of election districts.rs Indeed, to create an effective remedy for discrimination in the distribution of voting power, it may be impossible
for the courts to ignore the racial composition of districts. This does
not imply, however, that the courts must apply "reverse discrimination" to correct past abuses: they need only guarantee the minority
its fair share of political power? 63 Although some misgivings are still
law"- even though ordered by a federal court-is to be judged as a legislative rather than a
court-ordered plan. After Wise, it is unclear whether the plan in Kirksey, drawn by the county
board of supervisors and "approved and adopted" by the district court, 554 F.2d at 141-42,
was correctly treated by the Fifth Circuit as a court-ordered plan.
231 Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1975); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d
139, 151-52 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
131 Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 152. For example, barring exceptional circumstances, a court
may not employ multimember districts in its plan. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977);
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 19 (1975). See Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th
Cir.), vacated, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
2m See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classification, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination,62 CoRNnL L.
Rzv. 494, 541-44 (1977).
=' 430 U.S. 144 (1977).

Id. (majority opinion); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971) (school desegregation). See also 430 U.S. at 172 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring); Kirksey
v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 151-52 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977).
22 United Jewish Organizations concerned a plan designed to create black legislative
seats commensurate with, not exceeding, black population. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735 (1973) (districts designed to allocate legislative power fairly between Republicans
and Democrats).
The Fifth Circuit has recently taken the position that although proportional representation of racial groups is a permissible goal of legislative plans, it is an improper basis for court2m
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expressed about the possible ill effects of apparent preferential
treatment,237 these concerns might be allayed if the courts indicated
more clearly that the group for which a remedy is being provided is
a political group first and an ethnic group second, and if compensatory districting were available to all disadvantaged political groups.
In addition to the stricter substantive standard imposed on
court-ordered plans, the courts face difficult practical problems in
fashioning adequate remedies for voting dilution. A group that is
highly diffuse may be unable to benefit from any redrawing of district lines: if the only way to ensure political influence for such a
minority group would be to construct exceedingly ungainly districts,
the court would be unable to design a remedy. Some commentators
have suggested that gerrymanders would be discouraged if courts
required that districts always be drawn compactly.m There is no
assurance, however, that compact districts are always more fair
than unwieldy ones.s Normally one thinks of a gerrymander as the
use of stretched-out boundaries. In such cases, compactness may
provide an adequate standard for designing a remedy. In other
cases, the use of highly compact districts may be the most effective
way to shut out a minority from equal participation. A strict compactness requirement would leave groups that could benefit from
ordered reapportionment plans. Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth
Circuit has held that "safe" seats for minority groups are not required in a plan to remedy
voting dilution. E.g., United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir.
1978). The court recognizes, however, that judicial consideration of race in formulating a
remedial plan is not inappropriate. Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d at 936. In drawing plans
to remedy voting dilution, district judges must "be mindful of the impact of the proposed
plans on different racial groups..' Id. at 937. This requires analysis of the results of any
court-ordered plan in terms of the voting power of minority groups. Id. A tension between
this requirement and the prohibition of the use of proportional representation is bound to
result in cases in which voting blocs are polarized along racial lines. Remedies in such cases
must approximate proportional representation in order to be effective; such remedies will
evidently be permissible as long as this goal is not made explicit. Cf. Regents of Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978) (race may be one factor in making medical school
admissions decisions).
2 See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 171-72 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part). Justice Brennan suggests that "benign" racial districting may "disguise
a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries,"
or may further stigmatize racial groups, id. at 173-74, or may be viewed as unjust by those
who are disadvantaged by preferences for another group. Id. at 174-75.
211 See Schwartzburg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of
"Compactness," 50 MN. L. Rav. 443 (1966); Comment, PoliticalGerrymandering:A Statutory Compactness Standard as an Antidote for JudicialImpotence, 41 U. Cm. L. Ray. 398
(1974).
211 See Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target, in
REAPPORToNMEw iNmTHE 1970's at 138 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) (demonstrating how a more
compactly drawn district was more partisan in favor of the majority party than the former
plan).
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slightly stretching out districting lines remediless. 2 0
A compactness standard, even if appropriate, would not tell a
court where to draw the districting lines. Several different plans, all
using compact districts, can be designed for an area, but with very
different political consequences. The "higher standard" required of
courts in designing remedies surely does not always require courts
to choose the "most compact" plan; rather, it requires the court to
design the fairest possible plan. The court may have to decide between two or more feasible, compact district schemes; more than
one court has noted that there is no agreement on "whether the
political interests of a minority group are best maximized by an
overwhelming majority in a single district, bare majorities in more
than one district or a substantial proportion of the voters in a number of districts."' 1 The Supreme Court, in its preference for single
over multimember districts in court-ordered plans, has made a
judgment that a group is better off if it can elect one or more of its
own members. This preference can be justified on the theory that a
group can be more easily ignored when it has no spokesmen in the
elected body: its political influence, if any, is a step removed from
the decision-making process of the elected officials.
Where a multimember districting scheme is already in effect,
certain changes in the electoral machinery might be less disruptive
than the substitution of single-member districts, yet equally effective in increasing minority political power. If, for example, voters
were permitted to vote for less than a full slate of candidates, parties
that ran less than a full slate would have a greater chance of getting
elected. Going a step further, a court might call for cumulative
voting.2 42 Permitting voters to cast all their votes for a single candidate virtually assures minority representation, regardless of how
diffuse the minority is. Thus far, however, courts have confined
their remedial activities to redrawing lines-perhaps because it is a
task to which they have grown accustomed, and perhaps because
thus far the groups that have brought dilution claims have lived
sufficiently close together that redrawing lines will generally secure
them greater electoral influence.
For groups that comprise a very small percentage of the population, the only possible remedy might be to increase the number of
" For example, the minority party was able to achieve proportional representation
through the use of districts with slightly cumbersome shapes, in a plan approved by the
Supreme Court. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
2,tTurner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 n. 24 (5th Cir. 1973).
U! See ILL. CONST. art. 4 § 7; Blair, The Case for Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 47 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 344 (1952); Note, Ghetto Voting and At-Large Elections:A Subtle Infringement
Upon Minority Rights, supra note 19, at 1010.
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representatives in the legislature. Such a remedy would also be
beyond the court's power to implement, for a court has no standards43
to guide it in deciding on the optimal number of representatives.
Courts are not required to increase the size of the legislature
until
24
every interest group, no matter how minute, is represented. '
CONCLUSION

Gerrymandering is unconstitutional when it curtails voters'
"opportunity to participate in the political processes." Although the
rule is easily stated, the elements and scope of the voting dilution
cause of action remain unsettled. It is clear only that this
"opportunity" implies something more than a mere right to go to
the polls, but less than a right to be represented by a member of
one's political group. This comment has sought to demonstrate that
the individual's right to participate is best evaluated in terms of the
power of political groups. This protection of group political influence is derived from the "one person, one vote" rule of Reynolds v.
Sims.
Confusion over exactly which groups are protected against dilution of their political power has resulted from a failure to distinguish
the voting dilution cause of action from that class of cases brought
on a racial discrimination theory. The voting dilution claim, properly viewed as founded on the nonracial "political influence"
theory, should be available to any discrete political group. In addition, voting dilution challenges, unlike racial discrimination cases,
should not be held to include an intent requirement. Broader recognition of the voting dilution claim does not unduly restrict the freedom of legislatures to design districting plans: it is possible to protect the right of a group to its fair share of political influence, while
allowing for a wide variety of election outcomes. Nor will a broad
application of the cause of action impose an onerous burden on the
courts. Courts will be required to fashion remedies only in those
cases where plaintiffs have met their difficult burden of proof and
where a remedial districting plan can be practically designed to
protect the interests of the group.
Joseph C. Markowitz
11 The Supreme Court found it beyond the scope of the district court's remedial powers
to dramatically reduce the number of representatives to a state legislature. Sixty-Seventh
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.. 187 (1972). Minor variations in the number of
representatives would be permissible, though, in a court-ordered plan. See id. at 198-99.
24 See Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975).

